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A Two-Dimensional Semantics
for Epistemic Modals
Dan Quattrone
Georgetown University (USA)
Résumé : Tout le monde ne sait pas que l’eau est du H2O. Supposons qu’Alice
soit l’une de ces personnes. Alice dit : « Pour autant que je sache, l’eau pourrait
ne pas être du H2O. » Intuitivement, il semble qu’Alice ait dit quelque chose de
vrai. Autrement dit, il semble qu’il soit épistémiquement possible (pour Alice)
que l’eau ne soit pas du H2O. Pourtant, les conceptions traditionnelles de la mo-
dalité en linguistique et en philosophie du langage prédisent que tout énoncé
métaphysiquement impossible est également épistémiquement impossible (pour
qui que ce soit). Or, il y a des arguments plausibles, venant de Kripke et d’autres,
qui prétendent montrer qu’il est métaphysiquement impossible pour l’eau d’être
quoi que ce soit d’autre que du H2O. Selon ces conceptions standards de la mo-
dalité, Alice a donc en fait dit quelque chose de faux. Ce résultat est hautement
contre-intuitif. Je propose une nouvelle théorie de la modalité qui est capable de
représenter ce que j’appelle des IMEPs : des impossibilités métaphysiques épisté-
miquement possibles. Des phrases comme : « L’eau pourrait ne pas être du H2O »
et « Hesperus pourrait ne pas être Phosphorus » sont des exemples d’IMEPs, et
d’autres peuvent être facilement trouvés (y compris certains qui ne reposent pas
sur des considérations kripkéennes touchant à la possibilité métaphysique). Ma
théorie explique l’existence d’IMEPs tout en conservant la souplesse et la puis-
sance explicative des conceptions standards.
Abstract: Not everyone knows that water is H2O. Suppose Alice is one of those
people. Alice says: “For all I know, water might not be H2O.” Intuitively it seems
like Alice has spoken truly. That is, it seems like it is epistemically possible (for
Alice) that water is not H2O. However, conventional accounts of modality in
linguistics and philosophy of language predict that any metaphysically impos-
sible statement will also be epistemically impossible (for anyone). And there
are plausible arguments, from Kripke and others, that purport to show that it is
metaphysically impossible for water to be anything other than H2O. So accord-
ing to the standard accounts of modality, Alice has in fact said something false.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 16 (2), 2012, 59–84.
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This is highly counterintuitive. I offer a new account of modality that is capable
of representing what I call EPMIs: epistemically possible metaphysical impossi-
bilities. Sentences like: “Water might not be H2O” and “Hesperus might not be
Phosphorus” are examples of EPMIs, and others can be readily found (including
many that do not rely on Kripkean considerations about metaphysical possibil-
ity). My account explains the existence of EPMIs while retaining the versatility
and explanatory power of the standard accounts.
1 A motivational example
Alice and Bob are talking about water. They know that water is the clear
liquid typically found in lakes and rivers. They know that (pure) water is clear,
tasteless, and odorless. However, when asked: “Is water H2O?,” both of them
reply “I don’t know.” Alice says: “For all we know, water might be XYZ.” Bob
agrees. Given what Alice and Bob know, it seems like Alice has said something
true. Alice’s statement is an example of an epistemic modal. On the traditional
account of epistemic modals, we would say that Alice’s sentence expresses the
following proposition:
1) ♢E(Water is XYZ).
1
The question arises: how should we interpret the ♢E operator? Standard ac-
counts of modality treat all modal operators as quantifiers over some space of
possible worlds. Metaphysical possibility and necessity are standardly repre-
sented by quantifying over all possible worlds. 2 Statements of the form ♢Mp
are true iff there is some world in which p is true; statements of the form ◻Mp
are true iff p is true in every possible world. Other kinds of possibility—such as
epistemic or deontic possibility—have been analyzed by restricting the space of
possibility. For instance, on the standard account of epistemic possibility, the ♢E
operator quantifies over only those worlds consistent with our knowledge. That
is, we look at all possible worlds when we evaluate metaphysical modals, but
only some of the worlds (those consistent with what we know) when we evalu-
ate epistemic modals. The truth conditions for epistemic modals on this kind of
view look like this:
– Statements of the form ♢Ep are true iff there is some world consistent
with our knowledge in which p is true.
– Statements of the form ◻Ep are true iff p is true at all worlds consistent
with our knowledge.
1. A note on notation: ♢E indicates epistemic possibility. ◻E indicates epistemic ne-
cessity. ♢M and ◻M indicate metaphysical possibility and necessity, respectively.
2. Unless otherwise stated, all discussion of possible worlds involves metaphysically
possible worlds.
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But now we have a problem. Assume for the moment that Kripke and
Putnam are correct about the semantics for “water” and other natural kind terms,
as described in [Kripke 1980] and [Putnam 1996]. 3 On their view, natural kind
terms like “water” are rigid designators—that is, terms which denote the same
object or class of objects in any possible world. If “water” is a rigid designator
and it denotes H2O in this world, then it denotes H2O everywhere. Kripke and
Putnam argue further that the fact that names and natural kind terms function
as rigid designators entails that identity statements of the form “water is H2O”
express necessary truths, because “water” denotes H2O in all possible worlds,
and “H2O is H2O” is a necessary truth. This is the necessity of identity, and if
we have necessity of identity and “Water is H2O” is an identity statement, then
“Water is H2O” will express a necessary truth.
I will not detail the arguments advanced in favor of semantic externalism or
the arguments for necessity of identity. The main reason for this is that I aim
to present an account of epistemic possibility that is consistent with semantic
externalism and necessity of identity, and as such will not challenge the central
claims of the position. For my purposes, then, the arguments can be assumed
to stand. Note, though, that while I do not aim to refute semantic externalism,
I am not committed to its being true. Moreover, the problem I identify can
arise independently; for instance, in [Johnston 1997], Mark Johnston argues
that sentences like: “Water is H2O” are not identity statements but nonetheless
express necessary truths about material constitution.
Given this assumption, the standard account of epistemic modals says that
♢E(Water is XYZ) is true if there is an accessible (metaphysically) possible world
w such that:
1. w is consistent with Alice and Bob’s knowledge
2. in w, water is XYZ.
But Kripke and Putnam’s arguments for semantic externalism (and necessity of
identity in particular) show that water is necessarily H2O, and hence we will find
that there are no worlds in which water is XYZ. If there are no worlds in which
water is XYZ, then we will have to conclude that Alice said something false in
saying: “For all we know, water might be XYZ.” But we want to say that Alice
said something true. Intuitively, then, it seems that Alice’s statement expresses
an epistemically possible metaphysical impossibility, or an EPMI for short.
Standard accounts of modality (such as those given in [Kratzer 1977] and
[Portner 2009]) treat epistemic possibility as a restricted sort of metaphysical
possibility and hence predict that there will be no EPMIs. But cases like Alice’s
suggest this prediction is false. If we want to resolve this problem, it seems clear
that we have to say that Alice’s sentence doesn’t just express 1) above.
3. As we will see this assumption is not required in order to generate the problem under
consideration, but it does make it easier to produce examples.
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I want to suggest that Alice’s sentence is instead associated with a
metaproposition, and that it is this metaproposition which is epistemically pos-
sible. Intuitively, a metaproposition is supposed to represent something like a
Kaplanian character. Sentences with indexicals can express different proposi-
tions in different contexts, and the relation between the indexical and its contri-
bution to the proposition expressed is captured by the indexical’s character. In
the same way, the metaproposition is intended to capture the relation between
the world in which a sentence is produced and the proposition it expresses.
Formally, metapropositions are functions from a world w in which an expression
is produced (the worlds of production) to the propositions expressed by that
utterance when produced in w.
On this account, Alice’s sentence expresses a truth if there is a world w in
which she could utter the same sentence and have it express a proposition which
would be true when evaluated in w. 4 It seems reasonable to suppose that there
are such worlds. Twin Earth is one of them; as Putnam describes the scenario,
“water” picks out something XYZ when used by a Twin Earth native. If this is
correct, the sentence: “Water is XYZ” expresses a different proposition when
produced on Twin Earth than it does when produced here. In fact, the proposi-
tion it expresses when produced on Twin Earth (roughly, that XYZ is XYZ) is a
necessary truth. So if the sentence: “Water is XYZ” is produced on Twin Earth, it
expresses a proposition which is true when evaluated in Twin Earth, and hence
Alice’s original sentence (“Water might be XYZ”) expresses a truth here on the
actual world.
2 The problem with EPMIs
In the preceding section, I used: “Water might be XYZ” as an example of an
EPMI. This example relies on certain claims about the semantics of natural kind
terms. Kripke and Putnam advance similar claims about the semantics of names,
and as a result we can expect the problem of EPMIs to arise for them if Kripke
and Putnam are right. Furthermore, we can find examples of EPMIs that do
not rely on their (perhaps controversial) semantic claims. One possible exam-
ple (Johnston’s claim that: “Water is H2O” expresses a necessary truth about
material constitution) was given above; there are others.
For example, there are likely to be sentences which are either necessary or
impossible and whose truth value is independent of our knowledge. Let us call
such sentences unknown non-contingent sentences. Some statements of meta-
physical necessity and possibility might be unknown non-contingent sentences.
To borrow an example from Quine, consider the sentence: “It is metaphysi-
cally possible for something without extension to be colored.” If we do not
4. This formulation is missing a few refinements which will be introduced shortly.
A Two-Dimensional Semantics for Epistemic Modals 63
know the truth of this sentence, then it is an unknown non-contingent sentence
(assuming the truth of the principles of the modal logic S5). If it’s false, it is
presumably an EPMI.
Sentences regarding de re necessary properties of objects can also be un-
known non-contingent sentences, if we don’t know whether or not the object in
question has the property under consideration. For example, suppose that Alice,
a painter, is about to display her newest work. No one but Alice has seen the
work, which is named “Figure 1.” It is known, though, that Figure 1 depicts
a plane figure—in fact, it either depicts a square or a circle. We do not know
whether Figure 1 is a square or a circle. If Figure 1 is a square, it is necessar-
ily four-sided. 5 And so “Figure 1 is four-sided” is an unknown non-contingent
sentence. Suppose there is at least one unknown non-contingent sentence. If
that sentence is true, then it is metaphysically necessary but it might well be
epistemically contingent. If it is false, then it is metaphysically impossible but
it might well be epistemically contingent, in which case it could be an EPMI. In
either case, the problem I have outlined in this section for most extant accounts
of epistemic modality arises.
Once we have examples of EPMIs in hand, it is fairly easy to see why tradi-
tional accounts of epistemic modality cannot adequately account for them. On
the traditional account, epistemic possibility is taken to be a restricted sort of
metaphysical possibility. That is, if something is metaphysically impossible, it
must be epistemically impossible as well. This is because the traditional account
takes metaphysical impossibility to be falsehood in all possible worlds and takes
epistemic possibility to be truth in some possible world consistent with some
knowledge base. If there are no worlds in which a given statement s is true,
then we will not find any worlds consistent with any given knowledge base in
which s is true. To resolve this problem, we have to have an account of epis-
temic modality that takes epistemic possibility to be something other than a
restricted sort of metaphysical possibility. The metapropositional account that
I offer does just that.
3 The metapropositional account
Many semantic theories index truth to worlds. On such theories, truth is
understood as relative to a world. Consider, for example, the sentence: “Grass
is green.” In ordinary English, this sentence expresses the proposition that grass
is green. That proposition is true in some worlds and false in others. We might
5. This claim must be understood as a de re modal claim. That is, to claim that Figure 1
is necessarily four-sided is to claim that that very object could not have had three sides.
Alice could have created a different painting, and that painting could have been called
Figure 1, but it would not have been the very same object.
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represent the worlds in which this proposition is true graphically like so:
w u v
w T F T
In this representation, w is our world; u and v are other worlds. As the table
shows, in u, grass is not green, but in v it is. We could in principle extend
the table indefinitely to include all the possible worlds, and having done so
we would be in a position to say for any world whether or not grass is green
in that world.
Views in which truth is indexed to a single world are one-dimensional views.
My proposal is to adopt a version of the two-dimensional semantic framework.
In a two-dimensional theory, truth is indexed to pairs of worlds, represented
graphically by a two-dimensional array with worlds along both axes. There are
many ways of interpreting this array. I offer the following interpretation: ex-
pressions are associated with a metaproposition, which is represented by the
two-dimensional array. This array encodes information about how the proposi-
tion expressed by the expression depends on the world in which the expression
is produced; intuitively, it represents something like a Kaplanian character. The
worlds of production lie on the vertical axis of the array; the horizontal axis rep-
resents the worlds at which the expression is evaluated. Each row of the array
thus represents the proposition expressed by the expression when it is produced
in the corresponding world.
Consider the sentence: “Grass is green” once again. In our world, this sen-
tence (when uttered in ordinary English) expresses the proposition that grass
is green. But we can imagine worlds in which the sentence: “Grass is green”
expresses a different proposition because “grass” refers to some other substance.
Let us stipulate that x and y are worlds in which “Grass is green” expresses
a different proposition than it does here. We can represent this using a two-
dimensional array, like so:
w u v
w T F T
x F F T
y F F F
This array tells us that, when produced in x, the sentence: “Grass is green”
expresses a proposition which is true in y but false in w and x. And when it is
produced in y it expresses a necessary falsehood.
On my view, if I say: “Water might be XYZ,” I have said something true if
there is a world w in which three conditions are met. First, the sentence: “Water
is XYZ” has the same basic content 6 in w as it does in the actual world. Second,
6. “Basic content” is a technical notion which will be defined in §3.3.
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w is consistent with what my audience and I know. Finally, utterances of: “Water
is XYZ” express a true proposition when produced in w.
3.1 The formal machinery
On my theory, each expression is associated with a metaproposition, which is
a function from worlds in which the expression is produced (or worlds of pro-
duction and abbreviated WP ) to propositions. Propositions are functions from
worlds of evaluation (abbreviated WE) to truth values. WP includes only those
worlds in which expressions have the same basic content (in the sense given
later) as they do in the actual world. WE is the set of all worlds. WP is thus a
subset of WE . We can represent the metaproposition using a two-dimensional
array with the worlds in WP along the vertical axis and the worlds in WE along
the horizontal. When we adopt this approach, the entire array represents the
metaproposition. Each row represents the proposition expressed by the expres-
sion when produced in the corresponding world in WP .
7
All expressions are evaluated at a pair of worlds (w1, w2), where w1 rep-
resents the world of production and w2 represents the world of evaluation. A
sentence s is true at (w1, w2) iff w2 verifies s when s is produced at w1. We can
initially define the modal operators as follows:
– ♢M s is true at (w1, w2) when associated with the metaproposition f(w) iff
there is some world of evaluation v such that f(w1) is true at v.
– ♢Es is true at (w1, w2) when associated with the metaproposition f(w) iff
there is some world of evaluation u such that f(u) is true at u.
The necessity operators are defined in the traditional way. That is, ◻Es is true
iff ¬♢E¬s is true. The same relationship holds between ◻M and ♢M . Given
these truth definitions, we can see that a sentence s is metaphysically possible
when produced at w iff there is some point along the relevant horizontal row
at which s is true. s is epistemically possible iff there is some point along the
diagonal at which s is true. s will be metaphysically necessary when produced at
w if s is true at every point along the relevant horizontal row. Finally, s will be
epistemically necessary iff s is true at every point along the diagonal (subject to
a few restrictions, described below).
Again, we can represent this graphically. Consider “Water might be XYZ.” Let
us stipulate that w is our world. x is a world that is qualitatively indistinguishable
from our world, but it completely lacks H2O. Wherever H2O is found in our
world, we instead find XYZ in x. y can be any other world. My claim is that:
“Water might be XYZ” is an EPMI, which means that the embedded non-modal
7. A similar application of the two-dimensional framework can be found in Brian
Weatherson’s [Weatherson 2001]. Weatherson uses the two-dimensional framework to
give truth conditions for indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Indicative conditionals
have, as he puts it, a “well-known epistemic feel,” and the two-dimensional framework is
employed in order to capture that feel.
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sentence: “Water is XYZ” is epistemically possible but metaphysically impossible.
Here is what that will look like:
w u v
w F F F
x T T T
y F F F
When the sentence: “Water is XYZ” is produced in our world (that is, in w), it
expresses a necessary falsehood—namely, that H2O is XYZ. This accounts for the
“metaphysically impossible” portion of the EPMI designation. In x, the sentence
produces a different proposition. When an inhabitant of x says: “Water is XYZ,”
she expresses a necessary truth—that XYZ is XYZ. In particular, the proposition
expressed when “Water is XYZ” is uttered in x is true when evaluated at x (as the
center point of the array represents). So, by the definition given above, “Water
is XYZ” is epistemically possible.
That said, the truth definitions given above will not quite capture the be-
havior of actual epistemic modals. To do that we need to recognize two further
constraints. First, we have the basic content constraint: WP includes only those
worlds in which expressions retain the same basic content. “Basic content” is a
technical notion; I will introduce it in more detail in §3.3. For now, it suffices
to say that the basic content of an expression in a given language determines
the intension of the expression at every world of production, where intensions
are understood in the traditional way as functions from worlds (of evaluation,
in this case) to extensions. 8 Holding basic content fixed means we only look at
those worlds of production in which the function from world of production to
intension is the same as it is here.
The second constraint is that the only worlds we need to examine when eval-
uating epistemic modals are those that are consistent with what is known. We
introduce this constraint to capture the epistemic nature of epistemic modals.
We restrict WP to those worlds consistent with what is known. How is this
restriction to be understood? Often, this is done by taking what is known
to be a set of propositions, each of which is or determines a set of worlds.
The intersection of these sets of worlds is the knowledge base. We will adopt
this approach. 9 The claim that knowledge is propositional in this way is
8. The language itself also needs to be held constant. If the morpheme “gap” is used
by an English speaker it denotes a gap; in Polish, this morpheme denotes an onlooker.
Consider the English modal sentence: “For all I know, the gap between the door and the
platform might be six inches across.” When we evaluate this modal, “gap” will retain its
English meaning. Similarly, we require that the sentence be properly disambiguated. The
sentence: “For all I know, that might be a ball” could be about a formal dance or about
a round children’s toy (among other interpretations). We must disambiguate in order to
determine which sense of “ball” is in play and thus which basic content is relevant.
9. For our purposes, all that matters is that the object of knowledge determines a set
of worlds. We need not get embroiled in arguments regarding the object of knowledge
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consistent with the claim that propositions are not the object of epistemic
modal operators. 10 Ultimately, the semantic machinery that I deploy to ad-
dress epistemic modals does not depend on any particular characterization of
knowledge beyond its functional aspect. As long as what is known (what-
ever it is) determines a set of worlds which can function as a knowledge base,
my account should be fine.
With the notions of basic content and the knowledge base in hand, we can
revise the truth definition for the epistemic possibility operator like so:
– ♢Es is true at (w1, w2) when associated with the metaproposition f(w) iff
there is some world of evaluation u such that 1) f(u) is true at u without
change in basic content and 2) u is in the knowledge base.
Again, the epistemic necessity operator is defined in the traditional way.
3.1.1 The machinery in action
To see how the proposal developed in the previous subsection functions, I
will present two sample cases. For simplicity, the knowledge base will be shared
by all members of the conversation in both cases.
Case 1: Where’s Carol? Alice and Bob are in Washington, DC wonder-
ing where their friend Carol is. Carol is in fact in Zurich, but neither Alice
nor Bob know this; in fact, all they know is that she is not in Washington.
Alice says to Bob: “Carol might be in Cleveland.” On my account, Alice has
said something true iff there is a world w such that 1) the English sentence:
“Carol is in Cleveland” expresses a proposition which is true when evaluated in
w and 2) w is in the knowledge base. The knowledge base in this case con-
sists in those worlds in which Carol is not in Washington. 11 There is indeed
as long as it has this property. If the objects of knowledge are propositions, then that
satisfies our requirements. For simplicity I will continue to speak as though the objects
of knowledge are propositions and propositions are sets of worlds, but this is not strictly
speaking a requirement of the theory.
10. Notice that while this restriction involves the epistemic status of some agent or col-
lection of agents, it does not invoke any preexisting understanding of epistemic possibility.
To determine what worlds go in to WP , we attend to the epistemic status of the relevant
agent or agents in a single world—that is, what the agent or agents know about the world
they occupy and what further facts are consistent with that knowledge. But this is as it
should be, since epistemic possibility and epistemic modality are relative to what is known
by the relevant agent or agents.
11. The knowledge base will actually be smaller than indicated here, as Alice and Bob
have all sorts of incidental knowledge which is not relevant to the evaluation of the modal
sentence. For example, if Bob is wearing a red shirt (and is not red-green colorblind), then
he will likely know he is wearing a red shirt. So the knowledge base will include all the
worlds in which Carol is not in Washington and Bob is wearing a red shirt. But these other
bits of knowledge are irrelevant and so have been glossed over.
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such a world: namely, the world in which Carol is in Cleveland. So Alice has
said something true.
Case 2: Who’s Carol? Alice and Bob have noticed that their mutual friends
Carol and Eve are never seen together. Alice has begun to suspect that Carol
and Eve might in fact be the same person. She approaches Bob and voices her
suspicion, saying: “Carol might be Eve.” Here is what Alice and Bob know about
Carol: Carol has red hair. Carol is short. Carol works at the bank. Here is what
Alice and Bob know about Eve: Eve has red hair. Eve is short. Eve works for the
federal government. Eve looks very much like Carol. Let us stipulate that Carol
and Eve, despite their similar appearance, are different people. Then (given
that identity and distinctness are necessary), it is necessarily false that Carol
is Eve. Nonetheless it seems like Alice has said something true, so we seem
to have an EPMI.
On my account, in order for Alice to have said something true, there must be
a world w such that 1) the English sentence: “Carol is Eve” expresses a propo-
sition which is true when evaluated in w and 2) w is in the knowledge base.
This time, the knowledge base will include those worlds in which Alice and Bob
1) have a friend who is a short person with red hair who works at a bank and
answers to “Carol,” and 2) have a friend who is a short person with red hair who
works for the federal government and answers to “Eve.” These people need not
be distinct. So the world in which the person who answers to “Carol” is also the
person who answers to “Eve” is the world in which “Carol is Eve” expresses a
true proposition, and hence Alice has said something true.
It is important to note that this world is not a world in which Carol is Eve.
Rather, it is a world in which at least one of the names “Carol” and “Eve” denote
someone other than Carol and/or Eve and hence the expression: “Carol is Eve”
expresses a different proposition, though its basic content is unchanged.
Case 3: Could Carol be a Cylon? Alice and Bob are philosophers. They
wonder if their mutual friend Carol has any necessary properties. In particular,
they wonder if Carol must be made of matter. Alice says: “For all we know, it
might be that Carol might have been an artificial biological life form.” Let us
stipulate that the outermost modal in this case is epistemic, but the innermost
modal is metaphysical. Let us further suppose that Carol must not be an artifical
being but Alice and Bob do not know this to be the case. On my theory, Alice
has said something true if there is a world of production in the knowledge base
in which “Carol might have been an artificial biological life form” expresses a
true proposition. Since Carol is not an artificial biological life form, and Alice
and Bob know this, we must look for a world w in which “Carol” denotes an
object which is not an artificial biological life form in w but in which “Carol
is not a artificial biological lifeform” does not express a necessary truth. Here,
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we will run into difficulties. We require “Carol” to have the same basic content
in w as it does in the actual world. Since “Carol” is a rigid designator in the
actual world, it will have to be a rigid designator in w as well (though it may not
designate the same object in w as it does in the actual world). This means that
we will not find a world in WP that has the required properties and that Alice is
mistaken in saying that it might be that Carol might have been an artificial being,
despite the fact that Alice doesn’t know whether or not she might have been
an artifical being.
This may seem counterintuitive, but in fact this result is what we should
expect. First, it is important to note that one traditional gloss for epistemic
possibility is problematic. Traditionally, the statement: “s is epistemically pos-
sible for some agent A” is taken to mean something like: “A doesn’t know that
not-s.” This rendering entails that s is epistemically necessary iff s is known.
However, epistemic necessity and knowledge have different properties and ob-
tain in different circumstances. For instance, if the epistemic necessity operator
is defined as a quantifier over points of evaluation (including worlds in a one-
dimensional approach and pairs of worlds for the two-dimensional approach)
that uses Kripke models, then epistemic necessity will be closed under entail-
ment [Hintikka 1962]. Knowledge, on the other hand, is not. 12
Often, the problems involved with identifying knowledge with epistemic
necessity are addressed by treating epistemic necessity as an idealization of
knowledge—say, as knowledge for ideal reasoners or some such. I have a differ-
ent strategy. Rather than treat epistemic necessity as an idealization of knowl-
edge, I offer a different (and, I think, superior) intuitive rendering of epistemic
necessity. My proposal is to intuitively treat epistemic necessity as follows: s is
epistemically necessary for A iff s is known or is entailed by what is known by A.
s is known by A if A knows the proposition expressed by s in the actual world.
This entails that s is epistemically possible for A iff not-s is not logically entailed
by what A knows, or equivalently that s is consistent with what A knows. 13 One
reason to prefer my approach is that it permits us to treat epistemic necessity
as an independent object of study with interesting connections to knowledge
without requiring us to adopt a rarefied conception of knowledge itself.
Furthermore, my preferred gloss on epistemic possibility is itself a fairly com-
mon gloss on epistemic possibility, but the fact that it is not equivalent to the
other traditional interpretation given above has not been widely discussed. So
there is precedent for adopting my intuitive rendering of epistemic modals. It is
12. I take no position on whether or not knowledge is closed under known entailment
or under some other sort of operation. It is clear, though, that knowledge is not closed
under entailment simpliciter because this would entail logical omniscience.
13. I prefer to define epistemic necessity and possibility relative to knowledge bases, not
agents, but I am using agents here to bring out the issues that arise when we associate
epistemic necessity with knowledge in the traditional way. A statement can be said to be
epistemically necessary relative to an agent if it is epistemically necessary relative to the
knowledge base of all worlds compatible with everything that the agent knows.
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important to note that this is just an intuitive gloss on epistemic modality, and
any formal account may deviate from the intuitive notion at various points. This
is to be expected and perhaps even desired. After all, if we had perfectly clear
intuitions on epistemic modality we might not need an explicit analysis, and we
likely wouldn’t find any hard cases where it is unclear whether or not a given
expression is epistemically possible or necessary.
Moreover, in investigating our intuitions regarding epistemic modality we
might find that they are confused and contradictory; in this case no consistent
theory will adequately capture all our intuitions, but we should not want such a
theory. My formal account of epistemic modality is intended to stick close to the
second, superior intuitive gloss given above, but the theory may not capture the
intuitive gloss completely. Cases where the theory and the intuitive notion come
apart should be noted but in general, one should not assume that any individual
case not covered by the theory should refute it.
When we understand epistemic necessity and possibility in this way, we can
see that it is not consistent with Alice’s knowledge that Carol might have been
an artificial being. Alice knows that Carol is a natural being, and this entails
that it is metaphysically necessary that Carol is natural (assuming that Kripkean
views of metaphysical necessity are correct). Hence it is epistemically necessary
for Alice that Carol is necessarily natural. It is instructive to contrast this with
the case in which Alice doesn’t know whether or not water is H2O and says:
“For all we know, water might be XYZ.” “Water” is still a rigid designator in this
scenario, and it is a rigid designator in every world in WP . However, the crucial
difference here is that Alice doesn’t know that water is H2O, and so even though
it is metaphysically necessary that water is H2O, this is not logically entailed by
her knowledge. We will see the same result if we consider the case in which Alice
doesn’t know if Carol is natural or not, and says: “For all we know, Carol might
be artificial.” It is the nested metaphysical modal that leads to the seemingly
counterintuitive result.
In this case, “For all we know, it might be that Carol might have been an ar-
tificial biological life form,” looks like an EPMI, but it is not. Alice and Bob know
that Carol is a natural being, and hence “Carol is a natural being” is epistem-
ically necessary for them given the interpretation of epistemic necessity given
above. There is a peculiar feature of the sentence: “Carol is a natural being” that
deserves further attention. Given that Carol is a natural being, it follows from
the basic content of the sentence that it is metaphysically necessary that Carol is
a natural being. Since we hold basic content fixed, there is no way for the sen-
tence to produce a contingent proposition in any world of production (though it
could produce a necessarily true proposition or a necessarily false proposition).
There are other counterintuitive cases that warrant some analysis. Consider
the following example: “For all Andrew Wiles knew in 1992, Fermat’s theorem
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might have been false.” 14 This might strike us as true, but given the under-
standing of epistemic necessity and possibility given above (and given certain
plausible assumptions about Wiles’ knowledge), we should expect this sentence
to be false. Fermat’s theorem is presumably a necessary truth, and while Wiles
did not know that Fermat’s theorem was true in 1992, it was likely a conse-
quence of facts that he did know, as Wiles had been working on the proof for
years. So we should expect that Fermat’s theorem was in fact epistemically
necessary for Wiles in 1992.
It might be thought that this interpretation of epistemic necessity and pos-
sibility breaks the connection between these technical notions and the English
words used to express them, such as “might” and “must.” This is not the case.
Notice that we intuitively judge the sentence: “Given what Wiles knew in 1992,
Fermat’s theorem must have been true” to be true, as predicted by my preferred
intuitive gloss of epistemic possibility. A natural reading of this sentence is that
it is true if Fermat’s theorem is a consequence of Wiles’s knowledge in 1992. So
our intuitions seem to be inconsistent here. Any systematic approach to epis-
temic modality will thus run into counterintuitive cases. We get similar results
with unknown truths of mathematics. It is likely that no one currently knows
whether or not the Riemann hypothesis is true. As such, we might think that
the Riemann hypothesis and its negation are both epistemically possible for ev-
eryone. But this will only be true on one of the two intuitive interpretations
of epistemic possibility. On the interpretation I favor, if the Riemann hypothe-
sis is a consequence of what is known, then it is epistemically necessary even
though its truth value is unknown. Similarly, if its negation is a consequence of
what is known, then it is epistemically impossible even though its truth value is
unknown.
3.2 The metapropositional account in context
My theory is in many ways analogous to Kaplan’s account of indexicals in
[Kaplan 1989]. On Kaplan’s account, all utterances occur within a context of
utterance and are evaluated with respect to a circumstance of evaluation. This
context includes (at least) the speaker, the audience, and the time and place of
utterance. Kaplan also maintains that all utterances have a character, which is a
function from contexts of utterance to intensions. For many terms, this charac-
ter returns the same intension regardless of context of utterance. Indexicals are
unusual in that they have different intensions in different contexts of utterance;
for example, the intension of the word “I” (in its normal use) depends on the
identity of the speaker. Given this account, we can take the world in which the
utterance was produced to be part of the context of utterance. Names and nat-
14. Andrew Wiles first announced that he had proved Fermat’s Last Theorem in 1993.
While this version of the proof was flawed, his subsequent attempt in 1995 was successful.
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ural kind terms in my account function like indexicals do in Kaplan’s account, 15
except they are not (typically) sensitive to the common contextual variations like
changes in the speaker’s identity, the time of utterance, and so on. Rather, they
are sensitive to changes in the world of production. Since we cannot change
which world we’re in, we can’t normally change the index for the world of pro-
duction, and hence the interpretation of names and natural kind terms does not
vary due to variations in the world of production index.
However, when embedded under an epistemic modal, we evaluate the name
or natural kind term in the embedded expression as though it was produced in
another world. This makes the epistemic “might” and “must” into something
like what Kaplan calls monsters (and Evans calls context-shifting operators).
Monsters are operators that manipulate one of the indices for the context of
utterance rather than the circumstance of evaluation. Most operators are not
monstrous; for example, “someday” is a non-monstrous operator. A sentence
like: “Someday I will be rich” is true (very roughly) if there is a future time in
which I am rich. So in this case, we go looking for a circumstance in which I,
Dan Quattrone, am rich, and hence in which the sentence: “I am rich” comes
out true when uttered by me. However, note that the indexical “I” in “I am rich”
still refers to the original speaker. If I say: “Someday, I will be rich,” the sentence
will not be true if there is a time in which another person could truly utter the
sentence: “I am rich.” This is what distinguishes monsters from non-monsters.
Monsters affect the index for the context of utterance and in so doing affect the
value of indexicals.
Kaplan argues that there are no monsters in English and we could not add
any to the language. His argument fails. Kaplan’s argument proceeds as follows:
if there is any English expression that functions as a monster, it would be an
expression like: “In another context. . . ” But consider the sentence: “In another
context, I am tall.” Intuitively, we understand this sentence to be true if there is a
context in which I would be judged to be tall. But if “In another context. . . ” was
truly a monster, then we should expect “In another context, I am tall” to come
out true if there is a context containing a tall speaker, who need not be me.
That is, most speakers would not judge “In another context, I am tall” to be true
because there is a context in which “I am tall” is uttered by Robert Wadlow. 16
We might think that, while “In another context. . . ” does not shift the speaker
index, it does shift some other feature of the context. I am in fact of roughly
average height for an adult male, but I am tall compared to the average height
of a child. If I were to say: “In another context, I am tall,” we might judge
it to be true because “tall” is itself context-sensitive (though it is a gradable
15. Note that this fits well with Putnam’s suggestion that natural kind terms have an
indexical component. If Putnam is right, that would explain why natural kind terms behave
as they do. I am inclined to think Putnam’s claim is correct, but nothing here rests on
whether or not that is the case.
16. Robert Wadlow is listed in the Guinness Book of World Records as the world’s tallest
person, measured at 8 feet 11.1 inches just before his death.
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adjective rather than an indexical), and because there are contexts in which
the relevant height standard is different. However, the shift here is actually
part of the circumstance of evaluation. We can see this by considering cases
where there is a large gap between context of utterance and circumstance of
evaluation. Suppose I record myself saying: “I am tall.” We stipulate that the
relevant standard for height at the time I initially make the recording is such
that I count as tall. Years later, average heights have increased, and with it
the standards for tallness. The recording is played in this situation. Intuitively,
we would judge my utterance to be false when we hear it. This suggests that
“tall” is (at least on some occasions; see below for more discussion) sensitive
to features of the circumstance of evaluation rather than features of the context
of utterance. So “In another context. . . ” is not a monster. But if “In another
context. . . ” is not a monster, then surely nothing else could be.
I agree with Kaplan that “In another context. . . ” and expressions like it are,
at least initially, the most plausible candidates for monsterhood in English. I
also agree that such expressions are not monstrous. However, it does not fol-
low that there are no monsters in English. First, note that Kaplan’s argument
is an inductive argument with a very small initial sample, and so needs further
support. Second, and more importantly, there is empirical evidence suggesting
that English does contain monsters. In [Schlenker 2003] Philippe Schlenker has
argued that expressions like: “two days ago” and “in two days” display mon-
strous behavior, i.e. shift the context index. Consider the following example (a
modification of one of Schlenker’s examples):
Bob met Alice exactly one year ago. In two days, she would be
dead.
The indexical phrase “in two days” in the second sentence can be heard as re-
ferring to two days after Bob met Alice. However, the context of utterance is
one year after Bob met Alice. If Kaplan were right and there were no monsters
in English, it should be impossible to hear the phrase “in two days” as referring
to anything but two days from the time of utterance. Similar phenomena occur
when we translate these expressions into French, which lends credence to the
notion that these phenomena are not peculiar to English.
Schlenker also shows that the first-person pronoun can function monstrously
in other languages. In particular, he shows that the first-person pronoun in
Amharic can pick out persons other than the speaker in disquotational contexts,
which suggests that the operators that signal disquotation (e.g. “he said”) can
act as monsters in Amharic. So the Amharic sentence that would be lexically
translated as: “Alice said I am hungry” would be better read as: “Alice said she
is hungry.” This gives us evidence for monsters in other languages, which makes
the hypothesis that English has monsters of its own more plausible.
Consider another example: 17
17. Adapted from examples by Wayne Davis.
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Scenario: There is a picture of Superman hanging on the wall. Lex
Luthor comes in and places a placard next to the sign reading: “I
am Clark Kent.”
In this scenario, Luthor is the person producing the sentence: “I am Clark Kent.”
If Kaplan is right and there are no monsters in English, then we should expect
that the “I” in “I am Clark Kent” to pick out Luthor. But that is not what happens.
Instead, we have a case where Luthor can put words in Superman’s mouth (as
it were), and we hear the “I” as referring to Superman and not to the person
who actually produced the expression. This case is unusual in that there is no
explicit operator which causes the context index to shift; that said, the indexical
is still behaving as though it were governed by a monster, which suggests that
such behavior can be observed when there are explicit operators as well.
Finally, let us return to the case of “tall.” We have seen that “tall” is some-
times sensitive to features of the circumstances of evaluation rather than the
context of utterance. But that does not show that it is entirely insensitive to
features of the context of utterance. Consider, for example, the following exam-
ples: 18
1. Had I taken human growth hormone, I would have been tall.
2. Had I lived among the Kalahari Bushmen, I would have been tall.
Both of these sentences seem, intuitively, to be true, but for different reasons. In
the first case, the sentence is true using the ordinary standards for tallness. But
in the second case, the standards for tallness seem to shift; rather than use the
standards for early 21st-century Americans, we adopt the standards appropriate
for the Kalahari bushmen. This seems to be monstrous behavior.
Taken together, what these examples show is that while there are English
expressions which we would expect to be monsters but are non-monstrous, there
are also cases in which English indexicals behave as though they are governed
by a monstrous operator. Admittedly, this does not show that epistemic modals
are monsters; however, it does show that the hypothesis is not to be dismissed.
Moreover, recent work by Paolo Santorio [Santorio 2010] offers direct support
for the thesis. Further theoretical support is found in Brian Rabern’s [Rabern
2012], wherein he argues (among other things) that Kaplan’s own account of
demonstratives includes monsters. Given that the hypothesis is consistent with
the available evidence and offers considerable explanatory power, we should at
least tentatively accept it as (likely to be) true.
3.3 Basic content
One constraint on the theory developed above is thatWP includes only those
worlds in which words have the same basic content as they have in the actual
18. Adapted from examples by Steve Kuhn.
A Two-Dimensional Semantics for Epistemic Modals 75
world. In this section I will briefly discuss this constraint and present some
reasons for thinking it plausible that there is such a thing as basic content in the
relevant sense.
Basic content determines an expression’s intension at every world of produc-
tion. We can think of it as a function from worlds of production to intensions,
and intensions as functions from worlds of evaluation to extensions. We make
use of this concept because we do not want epistemic possibility claims for a
metaproposition p to depend on what the sentence expressing p says in some
other language or under unusual linguistic conventions. At the same time, the
basic content of a term cannot include the term’s extension. On the metapropo-
sitional view, the intension of a term (and, a fortiori its extension) depends on
the world in which it is produced. Since epistemic modals behave like monsters
and (effectively) change the index for the world of production, it follows that
terms embedded in an epistemic modal can have different extensions than they
normally have. Since the basic content of a term is always held fixed (even when
embedded in an epistemic modal), and the extension can sometimes vary, basic
contents cannot include or be identified with extensions.
This constitutes a break with some semantic externalists, notably Kripke,
who argues that the semantic content of a name or natural kind term is ex-
hausted by its reference. My claim is that names and natural kind terms (and, in
fact, almost all terms) have some semantic content (where “semantic content”
is broadly construed) beyond their reference. Putnam’s externalism (at least as
described in [Putnam 1996]) is prima facie compatible with this notion of basic
content, since Putnam allows for semantic contents other than reference.
The notion of basic content is fairly intuitive. In Putnam’s original Twin Earth
thought experiment, we might notice that if Oscar and his twin switched places,
such that Oscar was on Twin Earth and his duplicate was on Earth, neither Oscar
nor his twin would have trouble navigating their new worlds. If a Twin Earth
native were to say to Oscar: “Please bring me a glass of water,” Oscar would be
able to satisfy this request, even though he might think he’s providing a glass of
H2O. Twin Earth natives interacting with Oscar would judge him a competent
user of the language.
However, if Oscar were transported to a world in which “water” denoted
gasoline, he might not be so fortunate. Suppose that the world Oscar finds
himself on is chemically identical to Earth. However, in this world, “water”
denotes gasoline and another word denotes H2O (and XYZ is nowhere to be
found). Call this world Gas Earth. If a Gas Earth native were to say to Oscar:
“Please bring me a glass of water,” Oscar would not be able to satisfy the request
(at least not until he became assimilated to the peculiar linguistic practices of
Gas Earth). Oscar’s linguistic behaviors will be judged by Gas Earth natives to
be incorrect, and Oscar may have the same to say about the linguistic practices
on Gas Earth.
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The upshot of this is that there are behavioral similarities shared by the
linguistic communities on Earth and on Twin Earth, but which neither of them
share with the linguistic community on Gas Earth. Basic content is supposed to
be the explanation for these behavioral patterns. My suggestion is that the word
“water” has the same basic content on Earth as it does on Twin Earth, but not as
it does on Gas Earth. Very roughly, I take the basic content of an expression to
be those facts that are such that anyone who didn’t know them would be judged
not to understand the expression. For example, if someone did not know that
water is a liquid under normal conditions, we might very well think that they
don’t know what “water” means, and as such lacks the basic content associated
with “water.”
This rough characterization might seem to give rise to a problem. Consider
sentences like: “Some bachelors might be married” or “Some attorneys might
not be lawyers.” In both cases, we might envision a situation where someone
utters a sentence like this and believes that they have said something true. But
on my view, “Some attorneys might not be lawyers” can only express a truth if
“attorney” and “lawyer” have different basic contents. But if the basic content
of an expression is the facts that we’d say someone needs to know in order
to understand the expression, then it seems likely that “attorney” and “lawyer”
have the same basic content. Similarly, it seems likely that the basic content of
“bachelor” includes the fact that bachelors are unmarried. This issue generalizes,
as well; the examples above can be multiplied fairly easily.
But this is only a problem if someone can say: “Some attorneys might not be
lawyers” (or whatever example is chosen) and have it actually express a truth.
To be sure, the speaker might think they have said something true, and their
audience might agree—but that doesn’t mean they’re right. The only cases I
can imagine where the speaker or the audience might judge the sentence to be
true are cases where the speaker or the audience doesn’t understand the words
“lawyer” or “attorney.” The same goes for “Some bachelors might be married.”
In general, I would suggest that these are cases of linguistic confusion and do
not weigh against my theory. I would also note that we can be mistaken about
whether or not something is epistemically possible, and that mistakes in this
arena can come from many different sources. There may be things we do not
know we know, for instance, which may constrain our epistemic possibilities.
And there may be things we think we know but which are in fact false (and
hence not known). It does not seem strange to add linguistic confusions as
another source of error here.
4 Chalmers’s alternative
There are other approaches to the issue of epistemic possibility that use the two-
dimensional framework. The most prominent defender of two-dimensionalism
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in this area is David Chalmers, and so this section will focus on his account,
developed primarily in [Chalmers 2006].
At the outset, it is important to note that while Chalmers’s project does in-
volve epistemic modality, he is also interested in validating what he calls the
“Core Thesis.” On Chalmers’s view, a sentence S has two intensions, called 1-
intensions and 2-intensions, respectively. The nature of these intensions will be
explained shortly. Chalmers seeks to show that the following is true:
Core Thesis: For any sentence S, S is a priori iff S has a necessary
1-intension.
To accomplish this task, he introduces what he calls the epistemic understanding
of the two-dimensional semantic framework.
This epistemic understanding leads Chalmers to adopt a different interpre-
tation of the two-dimensional framework:
The core idea of two-dimensional semantics is that there are two
different ways in which the extension of an expression depends on
possible states of the world. First, the actual extension of an expres-
sion depends on the character of the actual world in which an ex-
pression is uttered. Second, the counterfactual extension depends
on the character of the counterfactual world in which the expres-
sion is evaluated. Corresponding to these two sorts of dependence,
expressions correspondingly have two sorts of intensions, associ-
ating possible states of the world with extensions in two different
ways. . . [Chalmers 2006]
These two intensions correspond to two different ways of thinking
of possibilities. In the first case, one thinks of a possibility as rep-
resenting a way the actual world might turn out to be: or as it is
sometimes put, one considers a possibility as actual. In the second
case, one acknowledges that the actual world is fixed, and thinks
of a possibility as a way the world might have been but is not: or
as it is sometimes put, one considers a possibility as counterfactual.
[Chalmers 2006]
So we have two intensions. Chalmers calls them 1-intensions and 2-intensions.
1-intensions correspond to possibilities considered as actual, and 2-intensions to
possibilities considered as counterfactual. 19
For instance, the sentence: “Water is H2O” is true in a world considered
as counterfactual when H2O is H2O. In a world considered as actual, though,
19. Chalmers takes the analysis of the two-dimensional framework in terms of possi-
bilities considered as actual and as counterfactual to be characteristic of two-dimensional
theories in general, but this is not obvious. For instance, the metapropositional approach I
have developed is best understood in terms of worlds of production and worlds of evalua-
tion. Chalmers is of course free to use possibilities considered as actual or counterfactual
as his intuitive starting point even if he’s wrong about it being a common starting point
among two-dimensional theories.
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“Water is H2O” is true (roughly) when the colorless, tasteless, potable liquid
in that world is H2O. So the 1-intension of “Water is H2O” assigns the value
“true” to all those worlds meeting the latter condition, and the 2-intension as-
signs the value “true” to all those worlds meeting the former condition (i.e.,
all of them). Similarly, the 1-intension of “water” maps “water” onto the col-
orless, etc. liquid in each world, without regard to its chemical properties,
while the 2-intension of “water” behaves like we would expect if “water” were a
Kripkean rigid designator.
The question arises: why should we think that terms like “water” and sen-
tences like: “Water is H2O” behave differently when evaluated with respect to
possibilities considered as actual than they do when evaluated with respect to
possibilities considered as counterfactual? The underlying intuition looks some-
thing like this. We know that water is H2O. But we can imagine that things were
different. Dalton, for instance, thought water was HO, in part because his tests
could not distinguish between H2O and HO. Perhaps we’re actually in a similar
position, and the actual world is not as we believe it to be. In fact, water is XYZ,
and our tests are incapable of distinguishing between H2O and XYZ. If things
are actually this way, we do not know that water is H2O after all, because water
isn’t H2O; it’s XYZ.
That is, given that water is actually H2O, it turns out that there is no way
things might have been (i.e., no possibility considered as counterfactual) in
which water is XYZ. But if the actual world is different than the way we think
it is, then perhaps water is not H2O. And we don’t always know which world is
the actual world—or at least we don’t always know how to distinguish the ac-
tual world from similar worlds by description. And even when we can identify a
given world w as non-actual, we can still consider how things appear to someone
who believes that w is actual.
Thus far, we have been treating possibilities as worlds, as is traditional (and
as we do on my metapropositional account). But this is a bit misleading where
Chalmers is concerned, because in [Chalmers 2006] he opts instead to analyze
epistemic possibilities in terms of what he calls scenarios. Roughly, according to
Chalmers, scenarios are to epistemic possibilities as worlds are to metaphysical
possibilities. That is, scenarios are maximal epistemic possibilities situated in
a space of all epistemic possibilities, which he calls epistemic space. Chalmers
offers up two ways of understanding scenarios. First, he provides an account
of scenarios in terms of centered worlds. Centered worlds are ordered pairs
consisting in a possible world and a privileged point (called a center). This
point specifies a place, time, and an agent in the world and is used to eval-
uate indexical expressions. Alternatively, he suggests that we can understand
scenarios as equivalence classes of infinitary “epistemically complete” sentences
in a constructed language L. A sentence S is epistemically complete if it has
the following properties:
A Two-Dimensional Semantics for Epistemic Modals 79
1. S is epistemically possible. 20
2. There is no sentence T in L such that S & T and S & ¬T are both epistemi-
cally possible.
The language L itself has a limited vocabulary V with the following property:
Scrutability of Truth: There is a relatively limited vocabulary V such
that for any truth S, there is a V-truth D such that D implies S. 21
We need not concern ourselves with the details of these accounts of scenar-
ios. Chalmers does not definitively adopt either story, and we do not need to
do so in order to see how Chalmers’s account differs from my own or why we
might find Chalmers’s account problematic. There are two features shared by
both accounts that give rise to difficulties.
First, Chalmers understands scenarios as points in epistemic space. He char-
acterizes epistemic space in terms of a priori epistemic possibility. But charac-
terizing epistemic space in this way means that our notion of epistemic space
depends on our understanding of epistemic possibility. Indeed, Chalmers is
fairly explicit in taking deep epistemic necessity as a primitive (See, for exam-
ple, [Chalmers 2006, 79]). I take it that part of what it is to offer an analysis
of some phenomenon is to offer an explanation for that phenomenon. Ideally
this explanation will allow us to understand the phenomenon to be explained
in terms of some other phenomena which we already understand. But taking
epistemic necessity as a primitive makes it impossible to offer this sort of ex-
planation. Since Chalmers’s theory takes epistemic necessity as a primitive, it
seems like no matter what other virtues it has, we will not see any improvement
on whatever grasp we had on epistemic modality prior to encountering his ac-
count. That is, if we’re confused about the nature of epistemic necessity (and/or
epistemic possibility) before encountering Chalmers’s theory, we’ll be confused
after encountering the view as well. My metapropositional approach does not
take epistemic possibility (or epistemic necessity) as a primitive and so it offers
up the possibility of a genuine analysis of epistemic modality.
That said, it would be good to have a theory which allows us to determine the
truth conditions for an epistemic modal, for instance, even if that theory doesn’t
explain why any given epistemic modal has its particular truth conditions. Even
if Chalmers’s account fails as an analysis of epistemic modality, it might succeed
at some other worthy tasks. It is worth noting that, whatever Chalmers’s goal
may be in presenting his account, the fact that it fails as an analysis of epistemic
modality makes it less attractive compared to the metapropositional approach
I offer. The metapropositional approach, like any theory, has its primitives, but
neither epistemic necessity nor epistemic possibility are among them.
20. Note that here, as before, Chalmers takes epistemic possibility as a primitive.
21. Chalmers calls this Scrutability of Truth II; I’m omitting Scrutability of Truth I and
leaving off the number to avoid confusion.
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The second, and more significant, issue with Chalmers’s account has to
do with a property he calls “scrutability.” Chalmers claims that scenarios are
scrutable, and he characterizes scrutability thusly:
If we come to know that the world has a certain character, we are in
a position to conclude that the expression has a certain extension.
And if we were to learn that the world has a different character, we
would be in a position to conclude the expression has a different
extension. That is: we are in a position to come to know the ex-
tension of an expression, depending on which epistemic possibility
turns out to be actual.
Scrutability is a strong requirement, and it gives rise to problems. Chalmers
claims that there are relatively limited vocabularies that allow us to derive (using
a priori reasoning alone) all the facts about a world from a global description
of that world, but there is reason to think this claim is false. While it may be
that some worlds can be described in such a way as to make them scrutable, it
is not clear that all worlds have this property. Consider the following examples
(inspired by [Schroeter 2003]):
Case 1: Mixed Earth Mixed Earth is a world much like Earth. However,
while Earth has H2O, Mixed Earth is a world in which we find both H2O and XYZ
in roughly equal quantities. Lakes, rivers, and oceans are comprised of a mixture
of H2O and XYZ, as are the bodies of Mixed Earth’s residents. Mixed Earth’s
residents can drink H2O, XYZ, or the mixture of XYZ and H2O and respond in
the same way to all three options.
Case 2: Partitioned Earth Partitioned Earth is also a world in which we
find both H2O and XYZ in roughly equal quantities. However, any given lake,
river, or ocean is either entirely H2O or entirely XYZ. Roughly half of Partitioned
Earth’s residents have H2O as part of their makeup; the other half have XYZ.
H2O-people can drink XYZ and vice versa.
Case 3: Coke Earth Coke Earth is a world like Earth. In particular, Coke
Earth contains H2O in all the places that Earth does. However, due to a lucrative
marketing arrangement, the people of Coke Earth never imbibe H2O without
mixing it with other chemicals. In fact, they exclusively drink Coke Classic,
Cherry Coke, and other soft drinks produced by the Coca-Cola Company. 22 The
residents of Coke Earth have in fact been genetically modified to be unable to
drink H2O except when it is found in Coke products.
22. I have received no promotional considerations from Coca-Cola or any other soft
drink manufacturers.
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In all of these cases, we can ask the same question: what is the referent of
the term “water” if these worlds are considered as actual? Chalmers thinks we
have fairly clear intuitions about the answer to this question in the case of Twin
Earth (and not without reason). But what about Mixed Earth and its cohorts? I,
at least, lack clear intuitions about these worlds. First, note that all of these cases
appear to be deeply epistemically possible—that is, they all can be considered
as actual given what we know a priori (though they are all inconsistent with
our a posteriori knowledge of the actual world). The scrutability requirement
applies to all scenarios, and since all deep epistemic possibilities are covered by
some scenario or other, we should be able to say what “water” refers to in each
case. Let’s start with Mixed Earth. When we consider Mixed Earth as actual,
we don’t seem to have any reason to think “water” refers to H2O rather than
XYZ (assuming it can’t refer to both). Perhaps “water” on Mixed Earth functions
like “jade” does (or did) in the actual world—but perhaps it doesn’t. I, at least,
lack strong intuitions one way or the other. And now consider Partitioned Earth.
Partitioned Earth has the same kinds of stuff as Mixed Earth, but in different
arrangements. Here, too, I lack clear intuitions, excepting the following: it seems
less likely to me that “water” functions like “jade” does in the actual world if
Partitioned Earth is considered as actual than it does if Mixed Earth is considered
as actual. And so it goes for Coke Earth as well; since the liquid found in lakes
and rivers is not the drinkable liquid that comes from our taps on Coke Earth,
it’s not clear which liquid should be the referent of “water.”
Here is why cases like these are problematic for Chalmers. Chalmers claims
that scenarios are scrutable, which means we can infer (using only a priori
means) the reference of various expressions from the description of a possibility.
Cases like 1-3, though, suggest that there are at least some worlds where this in-
ference is not possibility. Admittedly, cases 1-3 trade on our intuitions (or more
precisely our lack of intuitions) about particular cases, and intuition is not the
same as a priori reasoning. But Chalmers trades on our intuitions as well, using
examples like Twin Earth to motivate his scrutability claim. Furthermore, the
fact that we lack clear intuitions about cases 1-3 gives us reason to doubt that
they are scrutable.
Once we have a few examples like cases 1-3 above, it is easy to produce
more. What about the world which is like Coke Earth, except that the inhabitants
cannot drink H2O at all? Or the world in which its inhabitants are surrounded
by H2O but drink XYZ, or vice versa? Again, these cases are not ruled out by
our a priori knowledge, and so there is a scenario in which these cases obtain.
We ought, on Chalmers’s view, to be able to consider such possibilities as actual.
The ease with which we can construct problematic cases like these suggests that
Chalmers can’t beat this objection simply by addressing a few individual cases.
Chalmers might try to escape this criticism by claiming that the descriptions
given above are insufficiently detailed. Scenarios are, after all, epistemically
complete, while the descriptions in cases 1-3 certainly not. This is, I think, an
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unsatisfactory response. First of all, cases 1-3 are described in as much detail
as Twin Earth, and while it may very well be true that some worlds require
more description than others in order to be scrutable this shows that complete
descriptions are not always necessary in order to discern the referent of at least
some terms. Second, epistemically complete descriptions are inaccessible for
actual humans; even if we are to leave aside the fact that they are not expressed
or expressible in any natural language, the fact that they are infinitary sentences
puts them outside the reach of our cognitive machinery. If scrutability is to mean
anything it has to apply to incomplete descriptions of scenarios. Perhaps, with
more information, it would be possible to resolve cases 1-3 above—but that
doesn’t mean that all problematic cases can be handled in this way. Ultimately, I
think these considerations show that we would have to accept a large promissory
note in order to buy the scrutability claim.
The metapropositional approach presented in §3 does not have to worry
about this objection. The basic content constraint and the knowledge base con-
straint serve to rule out many of the worlds like Mixed Earth and its cohorts. It
may be that some cases like 1-3 remain, but as I have not made any claim com-
parable to Chalmers’s scrutability claim their existence is largely unproblematic
for my preferred view.
Scrutability also causes other problems. Chalmers’s arguments for scrutabil-
ity involve generalizing from the actual world. But consider alien prop-
erties. Alien properties are properties that are uninstantiated in the ac-
tual world, but are instantiated elsewhere. For the moment, let us stip-
ulate that there are alien properties. 23 Then there are worlds that in-
stantiate properties that are not instantiated here. And we have no rea-
son to think that such a world could be described using whatever lim-
ited vocabulary allows us to produce an epistemically complete description
of the actual world.
That said, Chalmers does not say that we can offer an epistemically complete
description of every world using some limited vocabulary. His claim, rather, is
that every (deep) epistemic possibility (i.e., every scenario) can be so described.
But remember that for Chalmers, a sentence is deeply epistemically possible if
it’s not ruled out by a priori reasoning. It seems highly likely that we do not
have a priori knowledge of precisely which properties are instantiated in the
actual world. That is, our a priori knowledge does not allow us to specify which
properties there are; given a list of all possible properties, we may not be in a
position to say which ones are instantiated in the actual world. Consider, for
instance, the positions of some ancient Greek philosophers, who thought that
all material objects consisted in various amounts of fire, earth, water, and air;
23. The existence of alien properties is controversial, but as we will see nothing in my
final argument depends on their existence. They are being used as a way of introducing
some unusual epistemic possibilities, and that’s it.
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it seems odd to say that these philosophers could have realized their error as a
result of a priori reasoning rather than as a result of empirical science.
The upshot of all this is that whether or not there are alien properties, it is
plausible that there are deep epistemic possibilities (i.e., scenarios) that instan-
tiate properties not found in the actual world. 24 And we have no reason to think
that these scenarios can be described using whatever limited vocabulary we find
that allows us to produce an epistemically complete description of the actual
world.
Chalmers’s approach, then, has some significant issues stemming mainly
from his characterization of scenarios as 1) points in epistemic space and 2)
scrutable. Since the metapropositional approach that I favor does not involve
epistemic space or have a scrutability requirement, it comes as no surprise that
it does not suffer from the same flaws.
Chalmers also offers up a typology of two-dimensional accounts. On his ty-
pology, my view would be closest to what he calls a semantic contextual under-
standing of the two-dimensional framework. Chalmers rejects this understand-
ing (along with all the other understandings) as being incapable of validating
the Core Thesis. As I have no particular interest in validating the Core Thesis, I
do not find this to be adequate reason to reject my view.
5 Conclusions
The upshot of this paper is this: if you’re going to use worlds (or situations) to
account for epistemic modality, two-dimensionalism is the most promising ex-
tant approach. Since the possible worlds framework has been successful thus
far in philosophy and linguistics, I opt for the two-dimensional alternative. My
proposed version of the two-dimensional solution to the problem of EPMIs is
not the only possible version; in particular, David Chalmers has his own under-
standing of the two-dimensional framework (put forward, among other places,
in [Chalmers 2006]) which differs from my own on several significant issues. I
have also given reason to think my view is more promising than his approach.
My main purpose here, though, is simply to present the problem of EPMIs and
offer a sketch of one two-dimensional solution along with some reasons to think
that two-dimensionalism is a promising line of inquiry, and that purpose, has, I
think, been fulfilled.
24. These properties, strictly speaking, wouldn’t be alien properties, since they might
not be instantiated at any world.
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